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Following the large increase in Higher Education (HE) tuition fees in 2012, together with later 
variations in the terms of repayment and the interest rate to be paid, new graduates are now 
leaving university with very heavy debt repayment obligations. These debts are both 
inequitable and difficult to sustain. Inequitable, because current and future generations of 
students are expected to pay for HE opportunities which previous generations of graduates 
received for free. Difficult to sustain, because three quarters of current student borrowers are 
not expected to be able to repay their loans in full before their outstanding debt is written off 
after 30 years, as provided for in the current loan system. The full extent of these under-
payments is hard to predict. Hence, the long-term fiscal foundations of the income-contingent 
loan system are both uncertain and weak.  
This paper sets out a proposal for an all-age graduate tax which would have three key 
advantages compared to the present HE loan system. First, in the interests of inter-
generational equity, this tax would be applied to all existing generations of graduates, not just 
to recent graduates who are expected to meet the onerous repayment obligations attached to 
student loans. Second, graduate tax payments made by those earning over £21 000 would be 
lower at all levels of earnings, than are current annual loan repayments, and thus less 
burdensome on graduates. Third, an all-age graduate tax would contribute  to government tax 
revenue from the first year that it was introduced, bringing substantially more revenue than 
the current level of loan repayments made to the Student Loans Company. It would thus provide 
a more secure fiscal foundation to HE finances than can be achieved through the present loan 
system. Furthermore, an all-age graduate tax could also provide a means of tackling the 
problem of accumulated loan debt incurred by recent graduates. 
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Following the large increase in Higher Education (HE) tuition fees in 2012, and later changes 
in the terms of loan repayment, including higher interest rates, new graduates are now leaving 
university with very heavy debt repayment obligations.  
The present system of students borrowing to pay for tuition fees, which they then pay back  
through income-contingent loan repayments over a 30 year period, is frequently justified on 
the grounds that graduates earn more on average than non-graduates and therefore should be 
expected to contribute to the costs of the privileged higher education that they have received.  
However, the debt now incurred by new graduates is in its own way inequitable, as well as 
being difficult to sustain. Inequitable, because current and future generations of students are 
expected to pay for HE opportunities which previous generations of graduates received for free. 
Difficult to sustain, because three quarters of current student borrowers are not expected to be 
able to repay their loans in full before their outstanding debt is written off after 30 years, as 
provided for in the current loan system. The full extent of these under-payments is hard to 
predict. Hence, the long-term fiscal foundations of the income-contingent loan system are both 
uncertain and weak.  
A common response to these problems is to call for tuition fees to be abolished and for the 
costs of free HE to be paid out of general tax revenue. However, there are also many other 
urgent claims on general tax revenue and many would argue that it would be inequitable to 
load too much of the costs of higher education on non-graduate taxpayers, who have not 
received private benefits from higher education study. Hence, in this paper we have set out an 
alternative proposal for an all-age graduate tax (GT) which could – if tuition fees are abolished  
-  contribute substantially to the costs of HE students’ tuition and maintenance in England.  
An all-age graduate tax would have three key advantages compared to the present HE loan 
system. First, in the interests of inter-generational equity, this tax would be applied to all 
existing generations of graduates, not just recent graduates who have taken out loans for fees 
and maintenance. Second, annual graduate tax payments for those over the £21,000 income 
threshold would be lower – in most cases substantially lower - than loan repayments under the 
current system and would therefore represent less of a financial burden on younger graduates 
who may also be struggling with high rents and mortgage payments. Third, an all-age graduate 
tax would contribute substantially to government tax revenue from the first year that it was 
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introduced and thus provide a more secure fiscal foundation to HE finances than can be 
achieved through the present loan system.  
This loan system is notable for the fact that student loan repayments are collected through the 
tax system, with repayments calculated by employers, taken directly from the salaries of 
indebted graduates and sent to HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC). Self-employed graduates 
are expected to declare their loan repayment obligations in their annual self-assessment tax 
returns. The effective level of ‘taxation’ for indebted graduates is relatively high: nine percent 
of all gross annual earnings above £21,000 over a 30 year period, with no adjustment for tax-
free personal allowances as occurs with income taxation. 
By contrast, an all-age graduate tax could be levied and collected in similar ways to graduate 
loan repayments but at much more tolerable rates than nine percent. For illustrative purposes, 
we have presented estimates of potential tax revenue from an all-age graduate tax which could 
be levied in two different ways: 
Graduate Tax (GT) Option 1: 2.5 percent of taxable income for employed graduates in England 
aged 20-64 who received a subsidised education in an English university. 
GT Option 2: 2.0 percent of taxable income in the basic rate tax band and 3.0 percent of taxable 
income in the higher rate tax band for employed graduates meeting the same criteria for age, 
country of residence and subsidised education in an English university.  
A £21,000 threshold for the all-age graduate tax to be applied is proposed so that graduates of 
all ages earning below this level are spared the burden of the tax in the same way that recent 
graduates earning below this level are not expected to start repaying their loans.  
For recent graduates the reduction in monthly outgoings under GT Option 1 for an all-age 
graduate tax would be considerable. For those with a gross annual income of £35,000, monthly 
outgoings would decline from an expected £105 per month to £50 per month. Under GT Option 
1, it is only when the gross annual income of employed graduates aged 20-64 rises to £60,000 
that their monthly graduate tax payments approach the level of monthly loan repayments 
currently expected of recent graduates earning £35,000.  
Drawing on Labour Force Survey data on the annual earnings of English-domiciled graduates 
in employment aged 20-64, we estimate that GT Options 1 and 2 would have yielded 
approximately £3.6-3.7 billion in annual tax revenues in 2016, more than double the annual 
loan repayments made by English-domiciled graduates in that year. This level of tax revenue 
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represents about 30-31 percent of the estimated total annual cost of providing tuition and 
maintenance for students studying towards First degree qualifications in England in 2016.  
 
Thus an all-age graduate tax levied at the rates discussed in our examples could make a 
substantial and immediate contribution to the costs of first degree tuition and maintenance were 
student fees to be abolished. As at the present time, a further substantial proportion of higher 
education costs would continue to be paid out of general taxation, consistent with the fact that 
higher education generates many social benefits as well as private benefits.  
 
An all-age graduate tax could also provide a means of tackling the problem of accumulated 
loan debt incurred by graduates in recent years. We suggest that indebted graduates could be 
offered a choice between continuing with their loan repayments and letting their payments 
under the all-age graduate tax be formally substituted for their debt repayments. For most of 
these graduates, the monthly graduate tax payments would be less onerous over a long period 
of time than their debt repayment obligations. However, there would be some long-term 
benefits in terms of tax revenue because, in common with all other graduates, these indebted 
graduates would be liable to pay the all-age graduate tax throughout their working lives – in 
contrast to their outstanding loan repayments which are scheduled to be written off after 30 
years.  
This approach to the question of accumulated student loan debt would recognise the fact that, 
while the problem has taken only a few years to develop, it will take decades even to be partially 
resolved. An all-age graduate tax would provide an equitable and fiscally responsible means of 
addressing the issue over the long term.  
The paper acknowledges that the many potential advantages of an all-age graduate tax will not 
be secured without concerted efforts to overcome practical and political difficulties. As with 
any new tax, it will be unpopular with some sections of the target group of tax-payers and 
concerns will arise about the scale of possible avoidance of the tax. Successful implementation 
of such a tax will therefore require both further research and investigation into the concept and 
persuasive campaigning to build political and social support for it. 
First, the specific examples that we offer of how such a tax could be designed and implemented 
are highly preliminary in nature. If any political parties or other organisations are interested in 
developing the proposal further, new research and investigation will be needed into alternative 
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tax designs and in developing projections of future graduate tax revenue under those different 
designs, to be compared with projections of future student loan repayments under the present 
tuition fee and loan system. Ideally, these projections would take account of potential 
behavioural responses to an all-age graduate tax as compared with behavioural responses to 
increases in student indebtedness under the present system. In addition, policy work is needed 
to assess how an all-age graduate tax might be combined with other initiatives such as 
expanding the links between apprenticeship training and HE study. 
Second, political parties or other organisations interested in the proposal will need to press its 
main underlying argument concerning inter-generational equity in a convincing and 
determined way. It should not be assumed that graduates in older age groups will automatically 
resist paying such a tax. Many older graduates will take the future interests of their own 
children and grandchildren into consideration when evaluating the merits of an all-age graduate 




















Tuition fees for higher education (HE) in England were first introduced in 1998 at a rate of 
£1000 per year. In 2006 this level of fees was trebled and in 2012 the maximum fee level was 
sharply increased again to reach £9000 per year. In order to help students pay such fees, an 
income-contingent loan system was introduced in 2006 in which students who took out tuition 
fee loans would not be expected to start repaying those loans until they were employed and 
earning above a specified income threshold (set at a gross annual income of £21,000 in 2012). 
After a specified period – 30 years in the case of student borrowers since 2012 – all outstanding 
loan repayments are written off.  
HE students are now also expected to borrow on similar terms to help pay for their living costs 
during their studies. After various changes in the availability of student maintenance grants 
over recent years, these grants were finally abolished in 2016 and replaced by extended 
provision of income-contingent maintenance loans.  
This system is frequently justified on the grounds that university graduates earn more on 
average than non-graduates and therefore should be expected to contribute to the costs of the 
privileged higher education that they have received. In a typical example of this thinking, the 
former Secretary of State for Education, Michael Gove, said recently that it was ‘wrong if 
people who don’t go to university find that they have to pay more in taxation to support those 
who do.’1  
However, the indebtedness which has been loaded onto HE students since 2006 is in its own 
way inequitable as well as being difficult to sustain.  
Inequitable, because current and future generations of students are expected to pay for HE 
opportunities which previous generations of graduates received for free (Green, 2017).   
Difficult to sustain, because student debt levels are already higher in England than in any other 
developed country and a very high proportion of current student borrowers – recently estimated 
at 77 percent by researchers at the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) - are not expected to be able 
to repay their loans in full before their outstanding debt is written off (Belfield et al, 2017).  
                                                          
1 Heather Stewart, ‘Michael Gove mounts defence of university tuition fees’, The Guardian, 2 July 2017. 
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This level of write-off is defended by the current Universities Minister Jo Johnson in the 
following way: ‘The government consciously subsidises the studies of those who for a variety 
of reasons, including family responsibilities, may not repay their loans in full…. This is a vital 
and deliberate investment in the skills base of this country, not a symptom of a broken student 
finance system.’2  
However, uncertainties about future debt write-offs have contributed to the worsening of the 
loan terms faced by recent graduates and current students, for example, unfavourable changes 
to the formulae by which interest rates have been calculated since 2012 and the freezing of the 
loan repayment threshold announced in 2016.3  In the January 2017 Fiscal Sustainability Report 
produced by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR, 2017), the student loan element of the 
National Debt is projected to represent about 11 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
2037-38, up from 5 percent in 2017-18.4 Since the National Debt as a whole is projected to 
represent about 95 percent of GDP in 2037-38,5 student debt will remain a relatively small part 
of the story so far as the Government’s ability to finance the National Debt over coming 
decades is concerned. But because the overall National Debt : GDP  ratio remains far above 
the level to which it had fallen before the 2008-09 recession, the growth of student loan debt 
must be one of many real concerns to HM Treasury - and this may explain some of the changes 
to interest rates and loan repayment thresholds and other steps taken since 2012 to increase 
debt collection from recent and future graduates.6   
A common response to the widely recognised increase in pressure on indebted graduates is to 
call for tuition fees to be abolished and for the costs of free HE to be paid out of general tax 
revenue. However, many would argue that this would be unfair on non-graduates taxpayers 
who have not received private benefits from HE study. There are also many other urgent claims 
on general tax revenue, including the need to meet the costs of high-quality health, social care 
and primary, secondary and vocational education services. Hence it will be difficult for any 
government to give top priority to free HE services over other claims on general tax revenue.  
                                                          
2 Quoted by Helen Warrell, ‘Political pressure builds to relieve student loans burden,’ Financial Times, 8 July 
2017. 
3 See Section 2.1 below for details of these changes to interest rates and to loan repayment thresholds. 
4 OBR, 2017, Chart 3.12: Additions to net debt from student loans. 
5 OBR, 2017, Chart 1: Central projection of the primary balance and Public Sector National Debt 
6 See McGettigan (2014) for an interesting description of the accounting conventions agreed in 2014 by HM 
Treasury and the government department then responsible for higher education (Department for Business, 




In this paper we set out an alternative proposal for an all-age graduate tax which could - if 
tuition fees are abolished - contribute substantially to the costs of HE students’ tuition and 
maintenance in England. Such a tax would still recognise that, although HE provides many 
social benefits, it also confers many private benefits that are unevenly distributed between 
individuals – and there is a case for asking graduates to pay more than non-graduates in the 
long-term for the private benefits arising from HE. An all-age graduate tax would have three  
key advantages compared to the present HE loan system. First, in the interests of inter-
generational equity, this tax would be applied to all existing generations of graduates, not just 
to recent graduates who have taken out loans for fees and maintenance. Second, annual 
graduate tax payments for recent graduates earning over the £21,000 threshold would be lower 
– in most cases substantially lower - than loan repayments under the current system and would 
therefore represent less of a financial burden, particularly for graduates in their thirties and 
forties who may be spending relatively high proportions of their incomes on rent or mortgages. 
Third, an all-age graduate tax would contribute substantially to government tax revenue from 
the first year that it was introduced, providing a more secure fiscal foundation to HE finances 
than can be achieved through the present loan system.  
The paper is ordered as follows. In Section 2 we describe the workings of the current student 
loan system and compare student loan repayments at given levels of income with the levels of 
additional tax payable under different scenarios of an all-age graduate tax. We also provide 
estimates of the extent to which the revenue from different kinds of all-age graduate tax could 
contribute to covering the costs of tuition and student maintenance for First degree (Bachelors) 
courses in England. In Section 3 we discuss how our proposed all-age graduate tax stands up 
to the arguments for and against graduate taxes of different kinds that were set out in the 
influential 1997 Dearing Report on Higher Education, and have been reiterated since by other 









2. Student Loan Repayments, the Revenue from an All-Age Graduate Tax 
and the Costs of HE Tuition and Maintenance in England 
 
2.1 Student Loan Repayments 
Throughout this report we focus primarily on England in order to concentrate on the broad 
policy alternatives under discussion without being distracted by institutional differences 
between the four UK nations (which deserve to be the subject of other research papers). 
However, where certain information also applies to UK students outside England, this is duly 
noted.  
Details of how student loan repayments are calculated are shown on the 
www.studentloanrepayment.co.uk website. As of 5th July 2017, ‘Plan 2’ borrowers in England 
and Wales – those who had taken out loans on or after 1st September 2012 - were expected to 
contribute to repayment of their loan in all pay periods where their gross (pre-tax) income 
exceeded a threshold of £21,000 per year or £1750 per month or £404 per week. The stipulated 
rate of repayment was nine percent of all income above this threshold.  
For example, those with a gross annual income of £35,000 were expected to pay £105 per 
month, calculated as follows: 
1) £35,000 less £21,000 = £14,000 
2) 9% of £14000 = £1260 
3) £1260/12 = £105 
For graduate employees, the repayments are calculated by employers, taken directly from their 
salaries and then sent directly at the end of each tax year to HM Revenue and Customs. Self-
employed graduates are expected to declare that they have a student loan to repay in their 
annual self-assessment tax returns.  
It is notable that this calculation method takes no account of the difference between gross 
income and taxable income (adjusted for tax-free personal allowances), in contrast to the way 
in which income tax, for example, is calculated.  
As of 31st March 2017, the outstanding debt on loans taken out by HE students based in 
England was £89.3 billion, up from £39.6 billion five years earlier, according to Student Loans 
Company (SLC) data. This represented just under 90 percent of the £100.5 billion outstanding 
debt on student loans across the UK at 31st March 2017 (SLC, 2017).  In total approximately 
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1.24 million HE students in England received SLC support of some kind in 2015-16 (ONS, 
2016). 
This rapid growth in student debt largely reflects the increase in tuition fees in 2012 and the 
accompanying increase in real interest rates charged to student loans, both while borrowers are 
studying and after they graduate.7 More recently, the total debt outstanding has been further 
increased by the abolition of maintenance grants in 2016 and their replacement by extended 
provision of income-contingent maintenance loans. Future repayment rates will also rise 
following the 2016 announcement of the £21,000 repayment threshold being frozen in cash 
terms for five years8 and the increase in the interest rate on many student loans from 4.6 percent 
to 6.1 percent which is planned for 1st September 2017.9  The combined effect of these changes 
could lead to an estimated average debt of £50,000 at the time of graduation for new students 
entering university in 2017 (Belfield et al, 2017:17). 
As noted above, recent estimates by IFS researchers suggest that as many as 77 percent of 
current student borrowers are not expected to be able to repay their loans in full before their 
outstanding debt is written off – up from 42 percent in the pre-2012 student loan system 
(ibid:19).  
Turning to a second measure of debt write-off, the most recent IFS estimates suggest that about 
31 percent  of the value of government lending to students will not be paid (ibid:7). This is 
lower than a previous IFS estimate of 43 percent of student borrowing to be written off 
(Crawford et al, 2014) and to a considerable extent it reflects changes in government 
accounting procedures with a lower discount rate being applied to future repayments by 
graduates (Belfield et al, 2017:8). Another reason for the reduction in the estimated share of 
student borrowing to be written off is the impact on student repayment obligations of the 
freezing of the £21,000 salary threshold for repayments, as described above.  
                                                          
7 7For loans taken out before 1st September 2012, the annual interest rate charged in the year ending 31st August 
2017 was 1.6%. For loans taken out since 1st September 2012, the interest rates charged in the year ending 31st 
August 2017 were 4.6% whilst studying and, following graduation, ranged on a sliding scale from 1.6% (for 
students whose annual income was £21,000 or less) to 4.6% (for students whose income was £41,000 or more). 
Source: https://www.slc.co.uk/students-and-customers/loan-repayment/interest-rates.aspx [26.8.17] 
 
8 Government guidelines originally stated that the repayment threshold would be uprated annually in line with 
average earnings. The retrospective changes in this and other loan terms establish a precedent for any of the 
terms and conditions of student loans to be changed without primary legislation. See Thompson (2016) for an 
exploration of the possible consequences. 
9 Lucy Warwick-Ching, ‘Student loan interest rates will rise to 6.1 per cent’, Financial Times, 13 April 2017. 
The interest rate on loans for current students is calculated as the Retail Price Index rate from March of each 
year plus 3%. 
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There will always be considerable uncertainty attached to estimates of the share of student debt 
that will need to be written off, if only because of the difficulty of predicting future trends in 
graduate earnings. However, even after taking such uncertainty into account, the order of 
magnitude conveyed by the IFS’s careful estimates makes it clear that the level of debt write-
off under the current student loan system will be substantial. It will therefore need to be covered 
by an equally substantial public subsidy to HE tuition and maintenance costs over the next 30 
years and beyond.  
This level of implied public subsidy under the current student loan system is one of several 
different factors which need to be taken into account in assessing the relative importance of the 
potential revenue from an all-age graduate tax, to which we now turn.  
 
2.2 How an All-age Graduate Tax Might Work 
As described above, student loan repayments by graduate employees are calculated by their 
employers, taken directly from their salaries and then sent directly at the end of each tax year 
to HM Revenue and Customs. At the same time, the loan repayment obligations of self-
employed graduates are calculated and processed through their annual self-assessment tax 
returns. Thus student loan repayments are effectively collected in ways that resemble taxation 
and are undoubtedly experienced by many indebted graduates as a form of taxation. Indeed, in 
2010 the then Universities Minister, David Willetts, was quoted as saying that students should 
consider university fees ‘more as an obligation to pay higher income tax’ than as a debt.10 
As things have turned out, the effective level of ‘taxation’ for indebted graduates is relatively 
high: nine percent of all gross annual earnings above £21,000 over a 30 year period, with no 
adjustment for tax-free personal allowances as occurs with income taxation. 11 
Our proposition is that an all-age graduate tax could be levied and collected in similar ways to 
graduate loan repayments and that this could be done at much more tolerable rates than nine 
                                                          
10 Quoted by Andrew Hough, ‘Students “are a burden on taxpayers”, new universities minister believes’, Daily 
Telegraph, 10 June 2010.   
11 Recent estimates prepared by London Economics suggest that ‘the effective marginal tax rates for graduates 
(i.e. the proportion of every £1 of additional earnings paid in income  tax,  National  Insurance  or  student  loan  
repayments) are prohibitive compared to both graduates without loans, and  non-graduates…. [In some 
occupations these marginal tax rates for indebted graduates range] up to 51%  for an extended period of time’ 
(Halterbeck and Conlon, 2017: iii) 
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percent. Here, for illustrative purposes, we present estimates of potential tax revenue from an 
all-age graduate tax which could be levied in two different ways: 
Graduate Tax (GT) Option 1: 2.5 percent of taxable income for employed graduates in England 
aged 20-64 whose gross annual income exceeds the £21,000 threshold applied in the student 
loan repayment system. 
GT Option 2: 2.0 percent of taxable income in the basic rate tax band and 3.0 percent of taxable 
income in the higher rate tax band for employed graduates meeting the same criteria for age, 
country of residence and income level.  
We focus on graduates aged 20-64 because of the relatively large sample sizes available in the 
Labour Force Survey for employed graduates in that broad age band. There is no reason in 
principle, however, why a graduate tax should not be extended to graduates above the age of 
64 if so decided by any government. (A) GT Option 1: tax levied at 2.5% of taxable income 
for graduates with gross annual incomes of £25,000 or more; tapered tax rates for gross incomes 
between £21,001-£24,999. 
Table 1: Estimated Individual Tax Liabilities under All-Age Graduate Taxes 
(A) GT Option 1: tax levied at 2.5% of taxable income for graduates with gross annual incomes 











21000 10000 0 0 0 
21500 10500 0.25 26 2 
22000 11000 0.75 83 7 
23000 12000 1.5 180 15 
24000 13000 2.0 260 22 
25000 14000 2.5 350 29 
30000 19000 2.5 475 40 
35000 24000 2.5 600 50 
40000 29000 2.5 725 60 
45000 34000 2.5 850 71 
50000 39000 2.5 975 81 
55000 44000 2.5 1100 92 
60000 49000 2.5 1225 102 
65000 54000 2.5 1350 113 
70000 59000 2.5 1475 123 
75000 64000 2.5 1600 133 
80000 69000 2.5 1725 144 
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(B) GT Option 2: tax levied at 2.0% of taxable income in the basic rate tax band; and 3.0% in 
the higher rate tax band; applies to graduates with gross annual incomes of £25,000 or more; 
























21000 10000 0 0 0 0 0 
21500 10500 0.25 26 0 26 2 
22000 11000 0.75 83 0 83 7 
23000 12000 1.5 180 0 180 15 
24000 13000 2.0 260 0 260 22 
25000 14000 2.0 280 0 280 23 
30000 19000 2.0 380 0 380 32 
35000 24000 2.0 480 0 480 40 
40000 29000 2.0 580 0 580 48 
45000 34000 3.0 640 60 700 58 
50000 39000 3.0 640 210 850 71 
55000 44000 3.0 640 360 1000 83 
60000 49000 3.0 640 510 1150 96 
65000 54000 3.0 640 660 1300 108 
70000 59000 3.0 640 810 1450 121 
75000 64000 3.0 640 960 1600 133 
80000 69000 3.0 640 1110 1750 146 
 
Notes: 
(a) Gross annual income less £11,000 personal allowance applicable in the 2016-17 tax year 
(b) Basic rate tax band in 2016-17: taxable income ranging from £0-32,000 
(c) Higher rate tax band in 2016-17: taxable income ranging from £32,001-150,000 
 
A £21,000 threshold for the all-age graduate tax to be applied is proposed so that graduates of 
all ages earning below this level are spared the burden of the tax in the same way that recent 
graduates earning below this level are not expected to start repaying their loans. In order to 
ensure that tax obligations do not exceed repayments under the present loan system, and to 
avoid sudden large jumps in tax liability, we also allow for tax rates to be tapered from 0.25 
percent to 2 percent for gross income levels between £21,000 and £24,999.  
For recent graduates the reduction in monthly outgoings under GT Option 1 for an all-age 
graduate tax would make a considerable difference to net incomes. To take the earlier example 
of those with a gross annual income of £35,000, monthly outgoings would decline from an 
expected £105 per month to £50 per month, calculated as follows: 
1) £35,000 less £11,000 (personal allowance in 2016-17) = £24,000 
16 
 
2) 2.5% of £24,000 = £600 
3) £600/12 = £50 
As shown in Table 1, Part A, under GT Option 1, it is only when the gross annual income of 
employed graduates aged 20-64 rises to £60,000 that their monthly graduate tax payments 
approach the level of monthly loan repayments currently expected of recent graduates earning 
£35,000. In the case of GT Option 2, the equivalent level of monthly payments would only 
apply to graduates with gross annual incomes of approximately £64,000 (Table 1, Part B).  
 
2.3 Potential Revenue from an All-Age Graduate Tax Levied on First Degree Graduates, 
England, 2016 
Clearly, both GT Options 1 and 2 offer the prospect of graduate contributions to HE tuition and 
maintenance costs being spread more equitably across employed graduates of all ages, not just 
loaded on to recent graduates who have student loans to repay. We now go on to investigate 
the level of revenue which could be generated by these tax options.  
In order to assess the number of graduates who might be potentially eligible to pay a graduate 
tax, and to gather information on their salary levels, we draw on Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
data for 2016. To obtain sample sizes sufficiently large to be disaggregated by age and gender, 
we focus on the 20-64 year old age group. However, there is no reason in principle why an all-
age graduate tax should not be extended to employed graduates aged 65 or older nor indeed to 
graduate pensioners with taxable income above a stipulated level; these would be decisions for 
government ministers to take. 
In 2016 there were just under 10 million graduates aged 20-64 domiciled in England of whom 
52 percent were female. ‘Graduates’ are here defined as persons holding First (Bachelor) 
degrees or higher qualifications. Approximately 8.6 million of English-domiciled graduates 
aged 20-64 were in employment of some kind (including self-employment), comprising 90 
percent of male graduates in this age group and 83 percent of female graduates. A markedly 
higher share of female graduates were employed part-time (18 percent) compared to 5 percent 
of male graduates. 
To estimate the number of English-domiciled graduates in employment who might have 
received subsidised undergraduate education in English universities, we define as ‘English-




(1) English-domiciled and English-born  
(2) English-domiciled, born in other European Economic Area (EEA) countries and who had 
arrived in the UK before the age of 21.12 
 
As shown in Table 2, this generates a total of 6.3 million employed graduates aged 20-64 who 
we treat as English-educated for purposes of our revenue estimates. This may be regarded as a 
conservative estimate because it omits some 970,000 UK-born and EEA-born graduates 
currently domiciled and working in England, some of whom may have received subsidised 
undergraduate education in English universities: these comprise English-domiciled graduates 
born in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland and others born in other EEA countries but who 
arrived in the UK after the age of 21.  Conversely, of course, an unknown proportion of those 
classified here as English-educated may not have received subsidised undergraduate education 
in English universities. This includes an increasing number of young English-domiciled 
graduates who chose to go abroad to study for their degrees and who should therefore not be 
subject to a graduate tax in England. Available data do not allow us to quantify the numbers in 
this category, and only new information collected either by employers or HMRC through self 
assessment tax returns could establish exactly how many would not be liable for the tax.  
 
Another important caveat is that, as discussed by the Office of National Statistics (ONS, 2015), 
there are reasons to regard the LFS as an inferior source of information on earnings compared 
to, say, the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), with the LFS tending to under-
report salary levels. However, surveys such as ASHE do not contain the information on 
educational qualification levels to analyse the revenue implications of all-age graduate taxes.  
 
In Table 3 we present LFS-derived salary information for English-domiciled graduate 
employees aged 20-64 who were either born in the UK or, if foreign-born, arrived in the UK 
from EEA countries before age 21. Self-employed graduates are excluded. These estimates 
show a very wide dispersion in gross annual salaries across genders and age-groups, with mean 
gross annual earnings for all graduate employees aged 20-64 estimated at £35,545 (just under 
                                                          
12 We use this age cut-off on the assumption that very few foreign-born EEA graduates domiciled in England 
would have been able to complete a degree in their home country and then migrated to England before the age 
of 21, since degrees are not normally completed before age 22 in these countries. Those with degrees who 
migrated before age 21 are therefore likely to have acquired them in England. It should be noted that we are also 
excluding non-EEA foreign born graduates (so-called ‘international students’) who, if they obtained their degree 
in England since 1981 have been paying ‘full-cost’ fees.  
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£42,390 for males; just under £29,100 for females). As shown in Table 4A, an estimated 73 
percent of these graduates earned £21,000 or more per year, the threshold for loan repayments 
under the present HE funding system. Only 28 percent of graduates (41 percent of males, 18 




Table 2: English-Educated Graduates Aged 20-64 in Employment in England, 2016 
 




6.1 million 71% born in England 
342000 4% born elsewhere in UK 
187000 2% EEA-born, arrived in UK before age 21 
629000 7% EEA-born, arrived in UK at age 21 or older 
432000 5% non-EEA born, arrived in UK before age 21 
932000 11% non-EEA-born, arrived in UK at age 21 or older 
   
'English-educated' defined as: 
6100000 English-domiciled and English-born  
plus 
187000 English-domiciled, EEA-born and arrived in UK before 
age 21 
6.3 million TOTAL: English-educated graduates, domiciled in 
England, aged 20-64 in employment 
 












Table 3: English-Domiciled Graduate Employees Aged 20-64, 2016: Distribution of 
















Age group:         
20-24 20441 8008 13884 20020 25584 30004  229 
25-29 30573 16016 21996 28548 35984 44980  515 
30-39 43343 20228 28808 39000 52000 73008  1093 
40-49 52148 21996 34008 44980 65988 90012  1006 
50-59 52288 20800 33800 47580 65988 98020  772 
60-64 43384 12012 22776 38012 55016 86996  209 
Total 42388 16484 25012 37024 52780 76492  3824 
















Age group:         
20-24 18150 7800 12584 17992 22984 26988  320 
25-29 25436 9984 17992 24492 30524 38480  688 
30-39 30752 11024 18980 28756 38480 51012  1470 
40-49 32741 10192 17992 30004 43004 56004  1179 
50-59 32336 10192 18200 30004 42016 53976  878 
60-64 29034 6500 11648 24024 39988 57980  173 
Total 29098 9984 17264 26000 37024 48984  4708 


















Age group:         
20-24 19185 7800 13000 18980 24024 29016  549 
25-29 27969 13988 19968 26000 34008 43212  1203 
30-39 36751 14976 23348 33488 44980 62504  2563 
40-49 42215 12948 24024 38012 52988 79976  2185 
50-59 42209 12948 23504 38012 53976 79976  1650 
60-64 36817 8424 16016 31980 47008 79976  382 
Total 35545 12012 20228 30004 44980 65000  8532 
 
Source: Derived from Labour Force Survey 2016 (all quarters). 
Notes: Population-weighted estimates. Refers to English-domiciled graduates who were either born in the UK or, if 
foreign-born, arrived in the UK from EEA countries before age 21. Excludes self-employed graduates. Gross 
annual salary is here defined as gross weekly pay in main job multiplied by 52. In calculating summary measures 





Table 4: English-Domiciled Graduate Employees Aged 20-64, 2016: Proportions 




A: Percentage of graduates earning £21,000 or more per year 
 
 Males Females Total 
 
Est. % of graduates earning £21,000 or 
more per year 
Age group:    
20-24 46 35 40 
25-29 77 63 71 
30-39 89 70 79 
40-49 90 69 79 
50-59 90 69 79 
60-64 77 56 67 
Total 82 64 73 
 
B: Percentage of graduates eligible to pay higher rate of tax (a) 
 
 Males Females Total 
 
Est. % of graduates earning £21,000 or 
more who are eligible to pay higher rate of 
tax 
Age group:    
20-24 <1 <1 <1 
25-29 13 1 10 
30-39 42 20 29 
40-49 55 25 41 
50-59 58 24 42 
60-64 43 22 32 
Total 41 18 28 
 
Source and notes: See Table 3 
(a) Taxable income in excess of £32,000 per year 
 
 
Under GT Option 1 (2.5 percent tax levied on all graduates with gross annual earnings of 
£25,000 or more per year, with lower rates for those earning between £21,000-24,999), we 
estimate that total annual revenue would be approximately £3.58 billion (Table 5A). Under the 
more progressive GT Option 2 (2.0 percent tax levied on taxable income in the basic rate tax 
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band and 3.0 percent of taxable income in the higher rate tax band), the estimated total annual 
revenue would be higher at £3.70 billion (Table 5B). Both these revenue estimates for 2016 
are more than double the annual loan repayments made by English-domiciled graduates in 
2015-16.13 
These calculations are intended to be purely illustrative. A range of alternative options in all-
age graduate tax design could usefully be explored, for example, with different rates of tax 
being applied, or the £21,000 lower bound to eligibility for the tax being replaced by another 
figure, or with the tax being extended to graduates above the age of 64. Nonetheless, the 
revenue estimates presented in Table 5 give some idea of the orders of magnitude associated 
with different rates of graduate tax.  
 
Table 5: Estimated Tax Revenue from All-Age Graduate Taxes Levied on English-
Educated Graduates Aged 20-64 in Employment in England, 2016 
 
A: GT Option 1: 2.5% tax levied on all graduates with gross annual earnings of £25,000 or 
more per year; tapered tax rates for gross earnings between £21,001-£24,999. 
 
6.3 million TOTAL: English-educated graduates, domiciled in 
England, aged 20-64 in employment (Table 2) 
of whom   
4.6 million  73% earn £21,000 or more per year (Table 4A) 
£43,000 Mean gross annual earnings of those earning  
£21,000 or more per year 
£32,000 Mean annual taxable pay of those earning  
£21,000 or more per year, assuming average personal 
allowance of £11,000 for tax year starting 5 April 2016. 
£100 million Estimated tax revenue foregone due to tapering of tax 
rates at annual incomes below £25,000 
£3.58 billion Estimated annual revenue  
[= (4.6 million * £32000 * 0.025) less £100 million] 
 
  
                                                          
13 In 2015-16 borrowers who received loans as English-domiciled students studying in the UK repaid an 
estimated £1.66 billion pounds to the Student Loans Company. Repayments by EU-domiciled students studying 
in England are excluded from this estimate. Source: ONS/SLC/Department of Education, Statistical First 
Release, Student Loans in England: Financial Year 2016-17, Tables 4a(ii) and 4b(ii). 




B: GT Option 2: 2.0% tax levied on taxable income in the basic rate tax band and 3.0% of 
taxable income in the higher rate tax band for all graduates with gross annual earnings of 
£25,000 or more per year; tapered tax rates for gross earnings between £21,001-£24,999. 
 
£64,000 Mean gross annual earnings of graduates earning £21000 
or more per year who are eligible to pay higher rate of 
tax (28% of graduates earning £21,000 or more; see 
Table 4B) 
£53,000 Assumed mean annual taxable pay of graduates earning 
£21,000 or more per year who are eligible to pay higher 
rate of tax 
£60 million Estimated tax revenue foregone due to tapering of tax 
rates at annual incomes below £25,000 
£3.70 billion Estimated annual revenue 
[= ((4.6 million * £32000 * 0.02) + (4.6 million * 0.28 * 
(£53,000-£32,000) * 0.03)) less £60 million] 
 
Notes: 
Salary estimates derived from LFS 2016 as described in notes to Table 3. 
Basic rate tax band in 2016-17: taxable income ranging from £0-32,000 
Higher rate tax band in 2016-17: taxable income ranging from £32,001-150,000   
 
2.4 Potential Contribution of All-Age Graduate Tax Revenue to Paying for First Degree 
Tuition and Maintenance Costs 
 
In order to evaluate the extent to which the revenue from an all-age graduate tax in England 
might contribute to covering the costs of First degree tuition and maintenance in English 
universities, we first need to estimate the total number of students who are currently receiving 
subsidised higher education in England. We take care to include part-time students in this 
assessment, as well as full-timers, since part-time students are often neglected in discussions 
about tuition fees and student loan debt.14 
 
To this end we first identify four groups of students enrolled in English universities in 2015-
16:  
                                                          
14 In fact part-time higher education enrolments have declined sharply (particularly among older students) since 
the 2006 and 2012 increases in tuition fees.  
Source: http://www.hefce.ac.uk/analysis/HEinEngland/undergraduate/parttime/ 
For background information on the associated decline in employer support for employees engaging in part-time 
higher education, see Mason (2014). 
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(1) 926, 485 full-time First degree students enrolled in English universities who were domiciled 
in England prior to their studies (HESA, 2017b, Table N).15 
 
(2) An estimated 129,700 part-time First degree students enrolled in English universities who 
were domiciled in England prior to their studies (derived using the ratio of part-time to full-
time English-domiciled undergraduate students in English universities in that year shown in 
HESA, 2017a, Table 7).16 
 
(3) 58,195 full-time First degree students enrolled in English universities whose domicile prior 
to commencing their studies was in other EU countries outside the UK (HESA, 2017a, Table 
1a). 
 
(4) 1575 part-time First degree students enrolled in English universities whose previous 
domicile was in other EU countries outside the UK (HESA, 2017a, Table 1a). 
 
We then estimate the total annual costs of providing tuition and maintenance for these four 
groups of students by adding together: 
 
(1) Total annual tuition fees chargeable to these students; 
 
(2) Estimated costs of teaching subsidies to universities for these students, provided by the 
Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE);  
 
(3) Estimated costs of maintenance grants for these students. 
 
As shown in Table 6, this yields an estimate of approximately £12.0 billion per year as the total 
annual cost of providing tuition and maintenance for subsidized students studying towards First 
degree qualifications in England in 2016. Annual revenue of approximately £3.6-3.7 billion 
from an all-age graduate tax would represent approximately 30-31 percent of these costs.  
 
                                                          
15 In HESA data ‘domicile’ refers to the normal country of residence of students prior to commencing their 
programme of study (Source: https://www.hesa.ac.uk/support/definitions/students#domicile). 
16 We estimate this because HESA only provides numbers for both full- and part-time English domiciled 
students for undergraduates as a whole, not for first-degree undergraduates.  
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Thus an all-age graduate tax levied at the rates discussed in our examples could make a 
substantial and immediate contribution to the costs of First degree tuition and maintenance in 
higher education were fees to be abolished. Moreover, it is likely that the proportion of 
employees liable for the graduate tax will continue to increase over the coming decades, as 
cohorts with low HE qualification rates exit the labour force and are replaced by cohorts with 
much higher HE qualification rates.17   
 
Table 6: Estimated Total Annual Costs of Tuition and Maintenance for First Degree-











Tuition fees for full-time students 984680 9000 8860 
Tuition fees for part-time students 131275 4500 590 
HEFCE teaching subsidies to 
universities for full-time students (a) 984680 700 690 
HEFCE teaching subsidies to 
universities for part-time students (a) 131275 350 45 
Maintenance grants for full-time 
students (b) 984680 1730 1700 
Maintenance grants for part-time 
students (b) 131275 865 115 
TOTAL   12000 
    
(a) Estimated costs per student per year derived from Crawford et al, 2014, Table B1, Row 3, updated to 2016 
prices (undiscounted). The estimates assume that full-time students’ degree courses are three years in duration 
and that part-time courses last on average six years, with annual fees at 50% of full-time fees on average. The 
total annual fees charged to part-time students in English universities are not recorded, because they vary in 
individual cases according to how many modules are taken. However, universities require a number of 
completed modules for graduation which is the same for part-time and full time students. The table excludes 
other government spending on higher education such as capital grants, research grants and grants for ‘widening 
participation’. It also omits the costs of the National Scholarship Programme which was abolished in 2015. 
    
(b) Estimated costs per student per year derived from Crawford et al, 2014, Table B1, Row 5, updated to 2016 
prices (undiscounted). Assumed that students’ degree courses are three full years in duration and that part-time 
costs are 50% of full-time costs.    
 
                                                          
17 An estimate of future trends in the size of the tax base for an all-age graduate tax would have to take account 
of any changes in employment rates amongst graduates, whether future non-UK EEA students would be entitled 
to subsidised HE study in England, and how many, if any, would be likely to enrol on subsided courses and 
remain in the country to work.    
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As at the present time, a further substantial proportion of higher education costs would continue 
to be paid out of general taxation, consistent with the fact that higher education generates many 
social benefits as well as private benefits (Marginson, 2007; McMahon, 2009).  
 
 
2.5 Tackling Accumulated Student Loan Debt 
 
As noted in Section 2.1, the outstanding debt on loans taken out by HE students based in 
England was £89.3 billion at 31st March 2017, just under 90 percent of the £100.5 billion 
outstanding debt on student loans across the UK at that date.  
Clearly, if tuition fees are to be abolished or reduced in the future, this would raise serious 
concerns about inequity in relation to the unfortunate cohort of graduates who would be left 
exposed to high levels of debt for the tuition fees applied during their years of study. 
Another important advantage of an all-age graduate tax is that it could provide a means of 
addressing the problem of accumulated loan debt. Rather than excuse indebted graduates from 
the all-age graduate tax because they have student loans to repay, it would be more equitable 
and viable in the long run for indebted graduates to be offered a choice between maintaining 
their loan repayments or being subject to an all-age graduate tax in the same way as other 
graduates - but with the tax payments of indebted graduates formally substituting for their debt 
repayments. Conversely, graduates who have already paid their tuition fees in full should be 
exempted from the all-age graduate tax in full or in part (depending on the level of fees 
involved, as deemed appropriate by the government of the day).  
For most indebted graduates, monthly graduate tax payments would be less onerous over a long 
period of time than their debt repayment obligations. However, there would be some long-term 
benefits in terms of tax revenue because, in common with all other graduates, these indebted 
graduates would be liable to pay the all-age graduate tax throughout their working lives – in 
contrast to their outstanding loan repayments which are scheduled to be written off after 30 
years.  
This approach to the question of accumulated student loan debt would recognise the fact that, 
while the problem has taken only a few years to develop, it will take decades even to be partially 
resolved. An all-age graduate tax would provide an equitable and fiscally responsible means of 
addressing the issue over the long term.  
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3. The Dearing Report’s Views on Graduate Taxes   
 
3.1 Responses to Dearing 
The present student loan system, with all its disadvantages, has its roots in the Dearing  Report 
(1997), following which tuition fees were introduced at £1000 per year, maintenance grants 
were temporarily abolished and income-contingent maintenance loans were introduced.  
Subsequently, in 2006, tuition fees were raised to £3000 per year and income-contingent tuition 
fee loans were introduced. These innovations paved the way for the heavy increase in tuition 
fees and student debt from 2012 onwards. 
In this context it is not often noted that the Dearing Report gave some thought to the option of 
funding HE (at least in part) through graduate taxes, on both existing graduates and future 
graduates (Paragraphs 20.25-20-29). It decided against both options but conceded that many of 
the options it did consider in more detail ‘(had) some features of a graduate tax’ (Paragraph 
20.29) – such as deferred contributions by future graduates (Paragraphs 20.30-20.34) and 
collecting contributions from future graduates in work (Paragraphs 21.40-21.49).  
The Report’s Recommendation 82 stated that:  
‘We recommend to the Government that the Inland Revenue should be used as the principal 
route for the collection of income contingent contributions from graduates in work, on behalf 
of the Student Loans Company’ (Paragraph 21.49). 
In making this recommendation, the Dearing Report was specifically referring to collecting 
income-contingent contributions from future graduates in work. It had earlier briefly 
considered the possibility of applying a graduate tax to existing graduates but rejected this 
option on the grounds of:  
‘[the] apparent difficulty of defining a “graduate” retrospectively and then identifying all 
individuals caught by the definition’ (Paragraph 20.26).  
Twenty years later, and following the pioneering work of HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) 
in implementing the collection of student loan repayments through the tax system (as described 
in Section 2.1 above), these objections to all-age graduate taxes carry less weight.  
For example, with regard to tax revenue deducted at source from employees’ gross earnings, 
employers already take responsibility for calculating loan repayments that recent graduates are 
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obliged to pay.18 In the case of existing graduates, employers could be required to set a date 
each year for graduate employees to notify them of their qualification status, and then seek 
instructions from HMRC as to what level of graduate tax (if any) should be collected from each 
employee – in the same way that student loan repayments are collected by employers. 
‘Qualification status’ in this context could be decided on the basis of employees’ answers to  
questions about whether they hold First/Bachelor degree qualifications, the universities from 
which they gained such qualifications, the year(s) in which these qualifications were awarded, 
and their nationality. Responsibility for the accuracy of these responses would fall on the 
individual employees themselves; it would not be reasonable to expect employers to take on 
responsibility for checking the information. 
 
In the case of graduates who already fill out self-assessment tax forms (for example, those in 
self-employment), the relevant tax forms already require them to provide answers to a number 
of detailed questions. It would not be difficult to require self-assessment tax-payers to answer 
additional questions about whether they hold First/Bachelors degree qualifications, the 
universities from which they gained such qualifications, the years in which the qualifications 
were awarded and their nationality 
 
As with any new tax, concerns will arise about possible avoidance and, as we discuss further 
below, different options for design and implementation of an all-age graduate tax need to be 
explored with a view to minimising this problem. However, in general terms, the incentives for 
honest compliance with an all-age graduate tax by individual graduate employees – and the 
penalties for non-compliance – would be the same as for any other element of the tax system.  
 
The Dearing Report raised a number of additional issues relating to taxes on future graduates 
which it considered made them undesirable as a means of financing higher education 
(Paragraph 20.28). We consider each of these in turn. 
                                                          
18 For details of these calculations, see HMRC, ‘Student Loan repayments: guidance for employers’, published 




Dearing 20.28, Point 1: [A tax on future graduates] ‘would provide no mechanism for those 
who might wish to pay at the time they receive the tuition (to avoid tax) and thereby foregoes 
any short-term benefits to the Exchequer, institutions, or graduates’ 
If tuition fees are abolished and replaced by an all-age graduate tax, the issue of upfront 
payment of fees will no longer be relevant.19 Regarding short-term benefits to the Exchequer, 
one of the attractions of an all-age graduate tax (as described above) is that it would contribute 
substantially to government tax revenue from the first year that it was introduced.  
Dearing 20.28, Point 2: [A tax on future graduates] ‘is open-ended: those graduates who are 
particularly successful will be expected to contribute large sums in total (even if their success 
has little to do with their higher education) which may encourage avoidance of the tax’ 
Our all-age graduate tax proposal is designed to be ‘progressive’ in that those who earn most 
contribute most towards the overall costs of their higher education. This differs from the present 
loan system where most graduates have incurred similar debts for tuition fees but lower-earning 
graduates have to contribute a higher proportion of their incomes to pay off their debts than do 
higher-earning graduates.  
Whether or not high-earning graduates in older age groups believe that higher education 
contributed towards their success, the main alternative at present to the onerous system of loan 
repayments imposed on younger generations of graduates is for university tuition and student 
maintenance costs to be wholly funded out of general taxation. An all-age graduate tax would 
be more discriminating than relying on general tax revenue in this way since it reduces the 
obligation for non-graduate tax-payers to support a higher education system in which they did 
not participate.    
Dearing 20.28, Point 3: [A tax on future graduates] ‘would provide no safeguard that higher 
education would receive any benefits from the contributions, since to provide such safeguards 
would cut across the general principle that tax revenue is not earmarked for particular 
services’ 
This would be true of an all-age graduate tax as with any form of income tax. However, future 
governments will continue to make pledges on higher education funding and, as with all such 
                                                          
19 Arguably, the right to pay tuition fees up front, which exists under the current fee and loan system, is inequitable 
because students with less affluent parents currently end up paying more in student loan interest than students 




spending commitments, it would be up to the electorate to hold them to account. In this 
particular case, we would recommend that future governments be obliged to publish figures for 
the revenue generated from an all-age graduate tax and to demonstrate how this revenue had 
been used to augment the portion of higher education funding pledged from general taxation. 
If the purposes for which the all-age graduate tax revenue is spent are clearly spelt out in this 
way, this tax may become more palatable to those liable to pay it than any non-hypothecated 
increase in income tax would be.  
Dearing 20.28, Point 4: ‘defining what length or type of higher education study made an 
individual liable for a 'graduate' supplementary tax would be difficult’ 
It should be possible for HMRC – in consultation with higher education experts - to agree on 
a definition of eligibility for an all-age graduate tax, taking into account the kind of information 
which individuals can readily make available, namely, the level and type of higher education 
qualifications which they hold, the universities which awarded those qualifications and the 
year(s) in which these qualifications were awarded.  
Our proposal limits liability for the graduate tax to those who have a First (Bachelor) degrees, 
or a higher level degree from an English University. It should also be noted that there is a 
widely accepted definition of what constitutes a Bachelor degree and that the Higher Education 
Statistics Agency (HESA) uses it for the purposes of compiling data on participation rates in 
different types of  HE course. Undergraduate and post-graduate qualifications are also defined 
by the OECD’s International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) which, in its 2011 
incarnation (UNESCO/OECD, 2011), classifies Bachelor degrees at ISCED level 6 and post-
graduate degrees at ISCED levels 7 and 8.  To participate in OECD international surveys, the 
Department for Education has to make a return to OECD specifying how the different 
qualifications available in England/UK should be attributed within the different classifications. 
This experience with  classification of qualifications should help in establishing which specific 
HE qualifications make holders liable for the graduate tax.  
Once HMRC has decided on the criteria for liability for the tax, employers should be able to 
use the qualifications information supplied by their employees to check on-line what tax rates 
(if any) should be applied to each employee. As we have described above, these and other 
practicalities involved in implementing an all-age graduate tax should be made easier by 
HMRC’s experience of setting up the current system of collecting student loan repayments 
through employers.  
30 
 
Dearing 20.28, Point 5: ‘it would not be straightforward (or necessarily desirable) to secure 
alignment with funding arrangements for further education; 
This is hardly an argument against an all-age graduate tax since there are good reasons to 
believe that expansion of full-time higher education in England (and the UK as a whole) has 
been over-emphasised in government policy at the expense of high-quality vocational 
education and intermediate skills training (Green and Mason, 2015; Wolf, 2016; Green, 2017). 
Arguably, the introduction of an all-age graduate tax would be consistent with rebalancing of 
education policy towards vocational and technical education below graduate level, as called 
for in a recent government Green Paper on industrial strategy (DBEIS, 2017).  
Dearing 20.28, Point 6: ‘there is no experience of graduate tax systems elsewhere in the 
world”. 
Lack of experience elsewhere did not stop Australia devising an income-contingent student 
loan system which was later emulated by several other countries, including England. These 
systems have proved to be highly inequitable with regard to the distribution of higher education 
costs between younger and older generations of graduates. The time has now come for policy-
makers to think imaginatively about how this inter-generational inequity can be alleviated.  
3.2 Responses to Other Objections Raised to Graduate Taxes. 
It is often noted (including by reviewers of this paper) that it would be difficult to collect the 
graduate tax from graduates who went abroad to work (see also Goodman et al, 2002). This is 
indeed a problem and one that does not arise to the same degree with loan repayments. In the 
latter case graduates with loans have a legal obligation to pay back their loans, according to the 
specified conditions, even after they have gone to work abroad. The Student Loans Company 
has a record of all persons with loan obligations, who are obliged to notify the company if they 
go to work abroad, even for a short period. If they fail to do so they are subject to additional 
interest charges, for which repayment can be legally enforced. In the case of a graduate tax 
system, it would be more difficult to collect taxes from graduates working abroad. Those who 
are still tax domiciled in England would be obliged to pay tax on foreign earnings and, 
presumably, if HMRC declared that they were liable, it would also be possible to collect 
graduate taxes from such people. However, for those resident abroad and not tax domiciled in 
England the options for collecting the tax would be much more limited. They might be liable 
to pay the tax on foreign earnings repatriated to the UK but even in this case, it would not be 
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enforceable unless HMRC already had records of such persons holding degrees from English 
Universities.  
Inevitably, some graduates migrate to work and pay taxes in other countries, as do workers 
with non-graduate qualifications. The real question of interest here is whether and to what 
extent graduates might be motivated to emigrate primarily in order to avoid a graduate tax. It 
seems unlikely that life-changing decisions of this kind would be made unless other influences 
besides taxes were also at work. Further research and investigation of potential behavioural 
responses to an all-age graduate tax is beyond the scope of this paper but it would be useful if 
such research could be carried out in time to inform the design of a graduate tax and related 
enforcement mechanisms.  
An objection in principle to a graduate tax that is also commonly raised in discussions, is that 
it represents a ‘retrospective’ tax. This objection may seem initially plausible since few 
taxpayers like to pay new taxes which they think they might have avoided had they been given 
sufficient advance warning (in this case it would have had to be given many decades before to 
have allowed older graduates to have made different decisions about HE participation). 
However, the argument does not stand up to fuller scrutiny since almost all new taxes could be 
argued to have ‘retrospective’ effects on the current costs and benefits of decisions made by 
individuals in the past. Individual taxpayers might argue, for instance, that recent reductions in 
capital gains tax were unfair to them because, had they known in advance, they would have 
invested more of their income in property and assets, thereby benefitting more from the tax 
change.  Some people wishing to sell more expensive homes may argue that they should have 
been warned about recent increases in stamp duty earlier so that they could have sold their 
homes earlier with lower costs. Governments generally provide some advance warning of 
changes in taxation policy but there are clearly limits to how far this can be applied.  
 
Governments do sometimes apply new tax rules differentially to different age groups – as with 
some changes in tax allowances. However, it is hard to see what ethical case could be made for 
applying a graduate tax more leniently to older generations of graduates. They have received 
private gains from their degrees which are unlikely to be exceeded, or even matched, by 






Following the sharp increase in HE tuition fees in 2012, together with later variations in the 
terms of repayment and the interest rate to be paid, new graduates are now leaving university 
with very heavy debt repayment obligations.  
The present system of students borrowing to pay for tuition fees and then making income-
contingent loan repayments over a 30 year period is frequently justified on the grounds that 
graduates earn more on average than non-graduates and therefore should be expected to 
contribute to the costs of the privileged higher education that they have received.  
However, the debt now incurred by new graduates is in its own way inequitable as well as 
being difficult to sustain. Inequitable, because current and future generations of students are 
expected to pay for HE opportunities which previous generations of graduates received for free. 
Difficult to sustain, because three quarters of current student borrowers are not expected to be 
able to repay their loans in full before their outstanding debt is written off after 30 years, as 
provided for in the current loan system. The full extent of these under-payments is hard to 
predict. Hence, the long-term fiscal foundations of the income-contingent loan system are both 
uncertain and weak.  
A common response to these problems is to call for tuition fees to be abolished and for the 
costs of free HE to be paid out of general tax revenue. However, there are also many other 
urgent claims on general tax revenue, and many would argue that non-graduates should not 
have to make disproportionate contribution to the costs of a higher education system from 
which they have not benefitted personally. Hence, in this paper we have set out an alternative 
proposal for an all-age graduate tax which could – if tuition fees are abolished  -  contribute 
substantially to the costs of HE students’ tuition and maintenance in England.  
An all-age graduate tax would have three key advantages compared to the present HE loan 
system. First, in the interests of inter-generational equity, this tax would be applied to all 
existing generations of graduates, not just recent graduates who are expected to meet the 
onerous repayment obligations attached to student loans. Second, annual graduate tax payments 
for those over the £21,000 threshold would be lower – in most cases substantially lower - than 
loan repayments under the current system and would therefore represent less of a financial 
burden on younger graduates who may also be struggling with high rents and mortgage 
payments. Third, an all-age graduate tax would contribute substantially to government tax 
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revenue from the first year that it was introduced and thus provide a more secure fiscal 
foundation to HE finances than can be achieved through the present loan system.  
Discussions for and against tuition fees in higher education have been raging for over a decade 
and have been a central feature of policy arguments between the main political parties during 
all general elections since 2005. However, these debates have, arguably, been overly polarised 
between those advocating that higher education should be funded entirely out of general 
taxation and those arguing that current student and recent graduates should make an additional 
contribution through fees, funded through loans.  
We argue in this paper that an all-age graduate tax offers a more imaginative approach to policy 
making, occupying a middle ground where opposing claims can be reconciled in a more 
equitable manner. The intense public interest in university tuition fees at the present time raises 
hopes that our idea for an all-age graduate tax will be seriously debated. 
However, the many potential advantages of an all-age graduate tax will not be secured without 
concerted efforts to overcome practical and political difficulties. As with any new tax, it will 
be unpopular with some sections of the target group of tax-payers and concerns will arise about 
the scale of possible avoidance of the tax. Successful implementation of such a tax will 
therefore require both further research and investigation into the concept and persuasive 
campaigning to build political and social support for it. 
First, the specific examples that we offer of how such a tax could be designed and implemented 
are highly preliminary in nature. If any political parties or other organisations are interested in 
developing the proposal further, new research and investigation will be needed into alternative 
tax designs and in developing projections of future graduate tax revenue under those different 
designs, to be compared with projections of future student loan repayments under the present 
tuition fee and loan system. Ideally, these projections would take account of potential 
behavioural responses to an all-age graduate tax as compared with behavioural responses to 
increases in student indebtedness under the present system. In addition, policy work is needed 
to assess how an all-age graduate tax might be combined with other initiatives such as 
expanding the links between apprenticeship training and HE study. 
Second, political parties or other organisations interested in the proposal will need to press its 
main underlying argument concerning inter-generational equity in a convincing and 
determined way. It should not be assumed that graduates in older age groups will automatically 
resist paying such a tax. Many older graduates will take the future interests of their own 
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children and grandchildren into consideration when evaluating the merits of an all-age graduate 
tax, and others will recognise the social benefits of enhancing equity between different 
generations.  
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